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AIRCRAFT PASSENGER TICKET CONTRACTS
JOHN K. EDMUNDS*
The tremendous growth of the aviation industry has given rise
to numerous problems concerning the duties, rights, and liabilities
of carriers of passengers by air. In the carriage of passengers, the
regular companies have found it desirable to include, in their tickets,
certain provisions concerning the liability of the company in case of
injury to passengers. This has been rendered desirable, in part, by
the lack of legislation governing the subject.' For some time, the
provisions in these contracts were as varied as the number of com-
panies offering tickets, but recently2 there has been a movement to-
ward uniformity which has culminated in the proposed uniform pas-
senger contract.8
It is the purpose of this article to consider the provisions of
some of these contracts and, especially, those of the uniform con-
tract, including, also, a discussion of the question of limitation of
carrier liability for injury to revenue passengers carried. For the
purpose of this discussion, it will be assumed that these regular com-
panies are engaged in a common carriage business.4
S*Mr. Edmunds is a graduate student in Northwestern University Law
School, and this article is part of a thesis to be submitted toward the re-
quirements of a master's degree.
1. The report of the Department of Commerce, Aeronautics Branch,
Aeronautics Bulletin, No. 18, revised to Sept. 1, 1929, reveals that, with
three exceptions (Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma) every state in the Union,
the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii and the Philippine Islands, have
passed legislation of some sort regulating aircraft. But, of these, Alaska,
District of Columbia, Philippine Islands, and twenty-three states make no
mention of liability whatever. Those states which have adopted the uniform
law proposed by the American Bar Association are in no better position since
this uniform law contains no provision with respect to carrier liability for
injury to passengers. (See sections 5, 6 and 7.) Three states (Arizona,
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania) definitely provide for such liability when
the injury is due to negligence, while two other states (Louisiana and Vir-
ginia) deal with the matter through the medium of insurance--either in the
act governing aviation or in other legislation.
2. See the report of the Committee on Uniform Ticket Contract and
Standard Ticket Forms, of the American Air Transport Association; J. W.
Brennan, chairman, R. A. Bishop, Col. L. H. Brittin, Howard Wikoff, counsel,
and Winsor Williams, manager.
3. See 1 JOURNAL OF Am LAw, 228, for report of the committee on uni-
form contract.
4. The Committee of the American Air Transport Association, an or-
ganization which includes twenty-two air carriers, in its recent report urging
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While the legislatures of the great majority of the States and
territories have studiously avoided the matter of liability of air car-
riers for injuries to passengers, the air transport companies them-
selves have, for the most part, not been idle. Most of them have
definitely denied all liability for injury to passengers.
A typical example of this is to be found in the contract pro-
visions of the ticket used by the Transcontinental Air Transport
Company. In signing the contract, the purchaser expressly agrees
as follows:
1. The holder of this ticket agrees that this ticket represents merely
a personal license and is revocable at the will of the Company, upon
refund of the purchase price therefor, without further liability to the
Company.
2. The user of this ticket agrees to observe the rules and regula-
tions of the Company and to obey the instructions of its agents and
employees.
3. The user of this ticket agrees that the Company, in the perform-
ance of the transportation covered by his ticket, is not a common carrier
for hire and/or liable as such, but is a private carrier; and that the
Company shall not be liable for injury or death to the person or loss
or damage to the property of the said user caused in any manner
whatsoever, whether attributable to negligence or not,6 occurring during
and/or arising out of the performance, or failure of performance, of
the transportation for which this ticket is issued.
4. The user of this ticket agrees that the Company shall not be
liable for any loss or damage caused by the delay or failure of aircraft
to depart from any point or arrive at any point, according to any
schedule, agreement, or otherwise.
5. The user of this ticket agrees that the Company may cancel the
trip or any part thereof and land and discharge him or her whenever
and wherever it deems fit, upon refund of that part of the fare equal
to the unusued portion of this ticket, without further liability to the
Company. - !
6. Any and all authorized sellers of this ticket act as the agent or
agents of this Company only and not as the agent of any railroad
company.
7. The above rules and conditions are binding, also, upon the
heirs, and/or personal representatives, and/or anyone claiming through,
the user of this ticket.
This ticket contract is opern to serious criticism. In the first
the adoption of the uniform ticket stated: "There is hardly a company that
has submitted its ticket form to your committee that is not, in the opinion
of a majority of the committee, a common carrier and would be adjudicated
such in any supreme court of the land." See, also, North American Accident
Insurance Co. v. Pitts, 213 Ala. 103 (1905) and Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
8 F. (2d) 996 (1925).
5. Cited in full, 1 JouR. AiR LAw, 36-37.
6. Italics ours.
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place, the company cannot avoid its status as a common carrier by a
stipulation in its contract to the effect that it is a private carrier, and
the fact that the passenger agrees makes no difference.7  Again, the
third provision of the contract purporting to exempt the carrier from
all liability whatsoever, whether resulting from negligence or not,
would not, in the opinion of the writer, be upheld by any court in
the United States, because of public policy.7a The fifth provision-
relative to landing and discharging of passengers-will no doubt be
upheld providing the landing and discharge of passengers in rea-
sonably necessary and that the place and manner of discharge are
also reasonable, but only if reasonable.
Companies using tickets with such contract provisions are no
doubt of the opinion that even if the provisions are not upheld by
the courts, they may at least aid in getting a less unfavorable de-
cision. It is believed that this position is unsound, and that the
provisions will militate against, rather than aid, the securing of a
decision favorable to the carriers.8
The use of ticket contracts purporting to exempt the carrier
from all liability for injury to passengers is not confined to the car-
riers operating in the United States. They were used in Europe for
some years before being adopted here. The following is an extract
from the general conditions regarding air transportation of the ticket
contract used by the German Luft Hansa :9
7. The Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357 (1873).
7a. The Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, supra; Powell v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 255 Mo. 420 (1914); Coleman v. Penn. R. Co., 242 Pa. 304 (1913);
Davis v. Chicago, etc., R, Co., 93 Wis. 470 (1896).
8. In a letter from Mr. Tex Marshall Vice-President and General
Manager of the Thompson Aeronautical Corporation, addressed to Mr. Win-
sor Williams, Manager, Americai Air Transport Association, the former
says: "As a matter of fact contracts were used on railway tickets for many
years and it was actually found that if anything the contract prejudiced the
court against the transport compank because it more or less seemed to be a
safe-guard against a known weakness or other defect known to the transport
company in their organization or e-quipment. Furthermore, we have been
told that in no instances did it prove of material assistance in preventing a
fair judgment against a transport company."
9. AuSZUG AUS DEN "ALLGEMEINEN BEFORDERUNGSBEDINGUNGEN FUR DEN
PASSAGIERLUFrVERKEHR."
Jeder Fluggast muss im Besitze eines giitigen Flugscheines sein. Der
Flugschein hat nur ffir den Tag und die Person, wie angegeben, Geltung.
Wird auf einen Flugschein einer Luftverkehrsgesellschaft die Befar-
derung durch ein Flugzeug einer anderen oder mehrerer anderer Luftverkehrs-
gesellschaften ausgefiihrt, so sind die Ausfiihrenden jeweils allein Vertrags-
gegner.
Ein Anspruch auf Ersatz eines Schadens--gleich, aus welchem Rechts-
grunde-der sich aus der Teilnahme am Fluge und der Benutzung des Zu-
bringerdienstes ergibt, gesteht weder gegeniiber der Luftverkehrsgesellschaft,
ihren Angestellten, den Unternehmungen und den Personen, deren sie sich
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Every passenger by air must be in possession.of a valid air ticket.
This air ticket is good only for the day and for the person specified
on the ticket.
If a ticket of the air transport company provides for transportation
by an airplane of another company or several other companies, these
companies are alone responsible.
A right of action for damages, regardess of the legal grounds,
which arises out of participation in the flight and the use of the services
given, exists neither against the air company itself, its employees, the
enterprises and the persons who serve toward the performance of their
obligations, nor against the agencies. Personal and baggage insurance
may be obtained at the agencies and from the commander of the aircraft.
One may enter and leave the aircraft only after obtaining per-
mission from the commander of the aircraft. The entrance doors may
not be opened by the passengers.
Furthermore, all "General Conditions Regarding Air Transporta-
tion" which are posted in the hangars and agencies are binding and
serve to enlarge upon the foregoing rules and regulations.
The exclusive General Air-Passenger Accident Insurance between
the German Luft Hansa Corporation and the Alliance and Stuttgart
Company Insurance Corporation is valid only when the air-passenger
1. Has paid in full for his ticket, or has paid the premium before
entering upon the flight, and
2. Has made the flight in a plane operated by the German Luft
Hansa Corporation, the German-Russian Air Transport Com-
pany, or the Austrian Air Transport Corporation.
If the flight is made in another aircraft, the passenger, if he wishes
zur Erfiillung ihrer Verbindlichkeiten bedient, noch gegenfiber den Agenturen.
Personen--und Gepdckversicherungen sind in den Agenturen und Flugleitungen
erhijltlich.
Das Besteigen oder Verlassen des Flugzeuges darf erst nach Aufforderung
durch die Flugleitung erfolgen. Die Einsteigtiiren diirfen von den Mitreisen-
den nicht ge6ffnet werden.
Im fibrigen finden die in den Flughifen und Agenturen aushingenden
"Allgemeine Bef6rderungsbedingungen ffir den Passagierluftverkehr" Anwen-
dung, durch die auch die vorstehenden Bestimmungen erginst werden.
Die zwischen der Deutsche Luft Hansa A. G., und der Allianz und Stutt-
garter Verein Versicherungs A. G. abgeschlossene Allgemeine Fluggast-Unfall-
versicherung gilt nur, wenn der Fluggast
1. den Flugschein voll gezahlt oder vor Antritt des Fluges die darauf ent-
fallende Pramie entrichtet hat und
2. DEN FLUG MIT EINEM FLUGZEUG AUSFiIHRT, DAS VON DER DEUTSCHE LuFr
HANSA A. G., DER DEUTSCHE-RussIscHE LUFTVERKEHRSGESELLSCHAFT On.
D. (STEREICHIscHE LUFTVERKEHRS A, G. BETRIEBEN WIRD.
Wird der Flug mit einem anderen Flugzeug durchgefiihrt, so muss der
Fluggast, sofern er versichert sein will, auf seine Kosten hier ffir eine beson-
dere Versicherung nehmen.
Versicherungsleistungen und Bedingungen k6nnen bei allen Flugleitungen
der Deutsche Luft Hansa A. G. eingesehen werden.
Auskiinfte dariiber, inwieweit allgemeine Fluggast-Unfallversicherungen
auch bei anderen Luftverkehrsgesellschaften bestehen, erteilen die Flugleit-
ungen und Agenturen.
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to be. insured must obtain (a) special insurance (policy) at his own
expense.
Insurance rates and stipulations, etc., can be examined at all offices
of the German Luft Hansa.
Information regarding general air passenger accident insurance in
relation to other companies, as well, may be had from the aircraft com-
manders and at the agencies.
The views of the German courts with respect to the validity of
-such contracts exempting the carrier from all liability for injuries to
the passenger are in direct conflict.10
Other air transport companies in the United States, while not
attempting to exempt themselves from liability altogether, have in-
serted in their contracts certain provisions limiting their liability to
definite amounts. Among these are the Boeing Air Transport Cor-
poration and the Colonial Airways Corporation. Paragraph 7 of
the new contract proposed for use by the Boeing Corporation is as
follows:
"LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. This is a Class A ticket. The fare
under a Class A ticket is lower than under a Class B ticket. In con-
sideration of said reduced fare, the passenger agrees that the Company
shall in no event be liable to said passenger, his heirs or representatives,
for injury or damage to said passenger in an excess of $25,000.00."
The ticket contract used by the Colonial Airways Corporation,
in addition to the usual provisions concerning the status of the com-
pany as a private carrier, etc., contains the following provisions re-
garding liability:
"6. That the holder voluntarily assumes the ordinary risks of air
transportation and stipulates that the Company shall not be responsible
save for its own negligence of duty, and that the liability of the Com-
pany to the holder hereof or his legal representatives, in case of acci-
dent resulting in death or physical disability, in any event, and under
any circumstances, is limited as follows:
Class A Contract (Minimum rate) Maximum liability $ 5,000.00.
Class B. Contract (Double rate) Maximum liability $10,000.00.
Class C Contract (Triple rate) Maximum liability $15,000.00."
Limitation of liability in consideration of a reduced rate of fare
has been tried with varying degrees of success in England, Canada,
and the United States. In the case of Clarke v. West Ham Corpo-
ration,11 decided in England in 1909, a municipal corporation owned
a tramway constructed under statutory powers. In accordance with
10. See Aircraft as Common Carriers, Carl Zollmann, 1 JouR. AIR LAW
197 (1930).
11. 2 K. B. 858.
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a statutory requirement they exhibited in a conspicuous place in
their tramcars a list of the fares to be exacted, and they appended
theretd a special notice to passengers stating, as the fact was, that
the fares charged were less than the maximum authorized charges,
and that in consideration thereof a passenger was only carried on
the terms that the maximum amount recoverable from the corpora-
tion, on account of an injury suffered by a passenger and for which
the corporation was legally liable, was 25. It was said by the court
in that case that if the corporation published alternative lists of
fares, one containing the maximum rates and the other containing
reduced rates, and gave an option to the passenger to pay either the
full rate without any condition limiting the liability or the reduced
rate with such a condition, a passenger electing to pay the smaller
rate would be bound by the conditions. In delivering the opinion,
Lord Coleridge said: "It is settled law that a railway company
may under certain circumstances limit their liability. They
may, if they please, offer a free pass to a passenger, or permit him
to travel under conditions which necessarily involve a greater risk
to himself on payment of a lower fare or none, and calf upon him to
absolve them of their liability in whole or in part ;" but no case has
been decided which permits a railway, canal, or tramway, company,
which has a duty to serve the public at large in the matter of car-
riage, to limit their liability without giving the passenger the option
to travel at their risk.""8
In Canada, the validity of a contract limiting or even exempting
the carrier from liability where the passenger rides for less than
full fare has been upheld.'-
The New York courts seem to follow the English rule that a
carrier may limit or even exempt itself from liability for injuries to
the passenger where the passenger rides at a reduced rate of fare.
In the case of Anderson v. Erie R. Co., 5 where a clergyman pro-
cured a clerical ticket for about one-half of the regular fare and,
in consideration thereof, expressly assumed "all risk of accidents
12. McCarwley v. Furness Ry. Co., Gallin v. London & North Western
Ry. Co., all v. North Eastern Ry. Co. These are cases cited in Clarke v. West
Ham Corporation, supra.
13. For other English cases regarding limitation of and exemption from
liability, see Hood v. Anchor Line (1918) A. C. 837; Cooke v. Wilson (1915)
85 L. T. (K.B.) 888; Spence v. Laird Line, Ltd. (1915) 41 I.L.T. 193. For
limitation of liability on workmen's tickets, see Hearn v. Southern Ry. Co.
1925) 41 T.L.R. 305. Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 5531891).
14. Grand Trunk v. Robinson (1915) A.C. 740 P.C.
15. 171 N. Y. App. Div. 687, 157 N. Y. S. 740 (1916) (Aff. 223 N. Y.
277 (1918).
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and damage to person or property, whether caused by negligence of
the company or that of its agents or employees or otherwise," and
was killed by the derailment of the train resulting from the breaking
of a defective rail, the court held that his administratrix could not
recover against the railroad company where it appeared that any
negligence causing the accident was that of the servants' 6 of the
defendant who laid the rails and had charge of the repairing of the
track." But, of course, such a ticket is used only by a special class
of people and is not available to all. There seems to be no case in
the United States which parallels the facts and holding of the Eng-
lish case. It is submitted, however, that the offering of an alterna-
tive rate with greater liability will not be sufficient to permit limita-
tion of liability for injury to passengers in the United States gen-
erally, however well the doctrine may be established in the carriage
of goods.' 7  From what has been said, a contract such as the Boeing
Company proposes would be upheld by the English courts and in
New York, provided the passenger is given the option of paying full
fare and riding at the company's risk. The contract of the Colonial
Airways Corporation, however, which limits liability in cases both
where the passenger rides at a reduced fare and where he pays the
maximum fare would probably be held invalid in any court. The
limitation with respect to Class A and Class B contracts would no
doubt be held valid in the English courts and in New York, but no
limitation could be placed upon the Class C contract calling for the'
payment by the passenger of the maximum fare.18
In the opinion of the writer, the uniform passenger contract,
drafted by the Committee of the American Air Transport Associa-
16. Perkins v. New York Central Rd. Co., 24 N. Y. 196 (1862) as to
distinction made by the New York courts between negligence of the board
of directors or managers who represent the corporation itself, for all general
purposes, and the negligence of other servants, holding that the company can-
not exempt itself from liability -for negligence of the former.
17. The rule adopted in the overwhelming majority of states is well
expressed by the court in Walther v. So. Pac. Co., 159 Cal. 769 (1911) as
follows: "Independent of statutory provisions it is almost universally held
that any contract purporting to exempt a common carrier of persons from
liability for negligence of himself or his servants to a passenger carried for
compensation is vpid, as being against public policy, and it is immaterial in
such cases that the attempted limitation on such liability as agreed to by the
passenger in consideration of special concessions in the matter of rate of fare
or other departure from the rules applicable to passengers paying full fare.
It is* enough that there is any consideration for the carriage." See also Crary
v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 203 Penn. St. Rep. 525 (1902).
18. See Bissel v. N. Y. Central Rd. Co., 25 N. Y. 442 (1862), affirmed in
Mynard v. Rd. Co., 71 N. Y. 180 (1877), see Meuer v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry.
Co., 5 S. D. 568 (1894), where such limitation of liability has been provided
for by statute.
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tion possesses considerable merit, and is quite likely to receive the
approval of the courts. It reads as follows:-
'"In consideration of the issuance to me of this ticket for transporta-
tion, I hereby agree as follows:
"ONE: (1) That said ticket represents a revocable license and
that the company or companies represented heirein may, with sufficient
cause to it or them, decline to carry me, nad in that event the sole
responsibility of the company or companies shall be to refund to me,
through regular channels, the price paid by me for said ticket; (2)
that if I am accepted as a passenger, I voluntarily assume the ordinary
risks of air transportation and stipulate that the company or companies
represented herein shall not be responsible save for its or their own
neglect of duty; (3) that after the commencement of the flight, I may
be landed or discharged in such manne' an& in such place or places as
the pilot, in his sole discretion, shall see fit, and in that event the only
responsibility of the company or companies named herein shall be to
refund to me such proportion of the price paid by me for this ticket
as the distance between the place of landing and the place of destination
bears to the whole length of the flight for which this ticket has been
issued.
TWO: (4) That this ticket is non-transferable and if presented
for passage by any person other than myself may be taken up and can-
celled without refund. (5) The presentation of this ticket and the use
of it by any person other than myself shall be considered a fraud and
trespass upon the company or companies.
THREE: (6) I further agree that the company or companies
represented herein shall not be liable for any loss or claim arising out
of delay or failure, for any reason, with or without advance notice, of
aircraft to depart from any point or arrive at any point according to
any schedule, agreement, statement or otherwise, nor for any loss or
damage or injury to any person or property, arising out of such con-
dition or otherwise, except negligence upon the part of the company
or companies represented herein.
FOUR: (7) The air transport company is not responsible beyond
its own lines and in selling this ticket and checking baggage thereon for
transportation beyond its own lines, this company acts as agent for the
other transportation agency or agencies. (8) The liability of the air
company for loss or damage to baggage and/oe personal property is
limited to the amount of $100.00, unless a higher valuation be declared
and an additional charge paid therefor.
In this proposed contract, there is no attempt to exempt the
carrier from liability for injuries to passengers or to limit such lia-
bility in any manner where the injury or damage grows out of the.
negligence of the company. This proposed uniform contract has been
approved by nine1' regular companies, and has been accepted, in
19. Colonial Airways Corporation, National Parks Airways, Hawaiian
Airways Company, Ltd., Rapid Air Lines, Northwest Airways, Stout Airways,
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principle, by many others. Various minor objections have been
made on the ground that it is better to have no contract at all,"0
that it leaves no choice to the passenger,21 and that the contract
makes no provision for a limitation of liability in consideration of a
reduced fare.22
The provision of the uniform contract that is open to the most
serious question and which will involve the most litigation is believed
to be part two of paragraph one: "that if I am accepted as a pas-
senger, I voluntarily assume the ordinary risks of air transportation
and stipulate that the company or companies represented herein shall
not be responsible save for its or their own neglect of duty." Two
problems will certainly arise when the courts have occasion to con-
sider this provision: (1) shall the rules of law governing other com-
mon carriers, with respect to assumption of risk. be applied to the
carrier by air? (2) If so, what are the ordinary risks of air trans-
portation ?28
Clifford Ball, Inc., Universal Aviation Corporation, Continental Air Services,
Inc.
20. This is the position of the Thompson Aeronautical Corporation, as
expressed in a letter to Mr. Winsor Williams. The letters referred to in this
article were made available to the writer through the kindness of Mr. Howard
Wikoff and Mr. Winsor Williams.
21. This is the suggestion of Mr. John F. O'Ryan, President, Colonial
Airways Corporation, in a letter of Feb. 18, 1930 to Mr. Winsor Williams.
22. This is the position of the Boeing Air Transport Corporation, as
expressed by Mr. A. K. Humphries in a letter of Feb. 26, 1930 to Mr. Winsor
Williams.
23. This question was raised by Mr. George B. Logan in a letter of
Feb. 26, 1930 to Mr. Howard Wikoff. Mr. Logan writes as follows:
"By paragraph (1) of the ticket, you ask the passenger to agree to two
things, first, to assume the ordinary risks of air transportation, and second,
to waive liability except for neglect of duty.
"Under many decisions, this contract, because you are a common carrier,
is void. The common carrier may not only not limit its liability for its
negligence, but it may not limit the degree of care required of it. There are
ample authorities for this statement.
"Assuming, however, that the foregoing statement of Law is incorrect and
assuming that your contract is valid, you then have a new contract concern-
ing a comparatively new industry in which two extremely indefinite terms are
left undefined. These terms are "ordinary risks of air transportation" and
"duty."
"Taking the latter one first, if we accept the word "duty" as meaning
the duty of a common carrier to a pay passenger, then you are back where
you started before the contract was signed. The duty of the common carrier
to its pay passengers is to exercise the highest degree of care; that being
so, there are no ordinary risks of transportation which the passenger may or
can assume.
"So far as I am aware, there are no "ordinary risks of railroad trans-
portation" as differentiated from failure to exercise the highest degree of
care. It is true that the State of New York has a statute allowing railroads
to contract against the ordinary risks of railway travel, including defective
rails, tracks, locomotives, cars, etc. Other states expressly disapprove of such
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That passengers by rail and other means of public carriage
must assume the risks necessarily incident to the mode of travel they
a statute and certainly in the absence of such a statute, the railway company
would be liable.
"What would be the ordinary risks of air transportation? Would a
structural failure of the plane, due to hidden defects, be such a risk? If
that were the carrier's defense, would it not be properly left to the jury?
If that were the carrier's defense, then under your ticket the carrier would
have to prove that it was an ordinary risk, assuming the ticket to be valid.
If the ticket is not valid and the common law rule applies, the burden would
be upon the carrier to establish the fact that the accident was not due to his
failure to exercise the highest degree of care. In either case, a practical
impossibility before a jury.
"Please bear in mind that my interest in the success of aviation is as
keen as that of anyone. I particularly would regret being put in a position
of being an enemy to progress or an enemy to success. My own humble
opinion is that the aircraft carriers should not, by ticket or otherwise, adver-
tise the risks of, air transportation, nor should they attempt to secure for
themselves privileges from liability not afforded other common carriers. After
all, it is largely a question of policy. Do the carriers prefer to attempt to
save some dollars out of accident claims by a doubtful legal expedient, or
do they prefer to put themselves on a parity with other common carriers as
speedily as possible in the public confidence, and thus attract additional dollars
by way of additional use of facilities offered.
"A study of the results of ticket-contract liability limitations in Germany,
both in the way of public opinion and of court decisions, is illuminative of
the futility of this policy.
"The status of air transport companies as common carriers has already
become fixed. In my opinion it is advantageous that this should be so, as
certain privileges will immediately follow the legal recognition of this fact
Air carriers will very shortly require the privilege of eminent domain, which
they will not secure while claiming for themselves exemptions as private
carriers.
"This claim, of course, is not openly made in your ticket, but the limited
liability clause can be based upon no other assumption.
"With your attempt to limit your liability for loss of baggage to $100.00,
I am quite in sympathy. Legally, it is not possible without statute. It was
the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act which permitted
the railroads to do this and until such a statute is enacted, I do not see how
the courts can fail to enforce the common law rule.
"In my opinion, clause (3) of paragraph (1) is probably enforceable,
but it would be very bad policy on the part of the companies to enforce it
strictly. If one should take passage from Chicago to St. Louis and should
pay $30.00 for the ticket (the former rate and possibly the future rate), and
the pilot was forced to descend in a corn field after traveling two-thirds of
the way, there would be necessary delays and expenses in transportation to
the nearest town and the securing of a train or other means to complete the
trip. The net result would doubtless be a complete loss of the time expected
to be saved by the air trip. A more satisfactory settlement with the passenger
would be to see to it that his total trip should cost him no more than the same
trip by railroad or other means requiring the same length of time.
"For your information, a similar case was recently presented to us for an
opinion. One of the air service companies here agreed for a fixed sum to
transport a passenger in an emergency case from St. Louis to New York.
The plane was forced down by a "low ceiling" near Pittsburgh. The passenger
was forced to secure transportation from the place of landing to Pittsburgh
and thence to New York by train. The net result of the journey was no
saving in time. The air company was inclined to refund only the unused
"mileage," as represented by their original charge, in other words, about one-
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adopt has long been well-settled law. 24 But whether the same rule
will be applied to carriers by air is open to question. It is urged
that because of the danger attendant upon air transportation and the
difficulty in determining whether an injury was the result of negli-
gence or whether it was one of the risks incident to air carriage,
that a greater liability than that applicable to other carriers should be
borne by the aviation companies. These arguments are weighty but
not impossible of refutation. Air transportation is not the perilous
adventure it was a few years ago. The licensing of pilots, coupled
with periodic physical and mental examinations, frequent inspections
of licensed planes, improved airways, etc., are constantly adding to
the safety of flight. Furthermore, knowledge of air navigation is
rapidly increasing. Governmental statistics show that during 1929,
there were more than one million miles flown by passenger airplanes
for each fatality. If the average person lived long enough, he
could travel 10,000 miles per year for over a hundred years before
meeting death due to airplane accident.2 5  We therefore are hardly
justified in viewing the airplane as so highly dangerous as to call
for any rule of absolute liability. It is manifestly more dangerous
than the ox-cart; but it takes less than an hour to make the trip from
New York-Philadelphia by air, while the stage-coach in 1758 re-
quired three days. A saving of seventy-one hours is worth some-
thing. Perhaps it is worth a somewhat increased risk.
The second argument advanced by those who would make the
carrier liable for all injuries to persons is that the proof of negligence
in airplane accident cases is too great to make negligence the test
for recovery. Granting that the proof of negligence is and will be,
for some years to come, more difficult than in the case of other com-
mon carriers, it remains to answer whether or not the air operator
should be liable when there is real doubt as to the cause of the ac-
cident. To hold the carrier liable for injuries resulting from unex-
third of the agreed price of transportation. Legally this was possibly correct,
but from the standpoint of a satisfied customer and of an enhanced public
approval of air lines, it was exceedingly poor policy. We recommended a
settlement based on the cost of railroad transportation to New York.
"I believe the idea of the air carriers having a uniform ticket is splendid.
In fact, the cooperation and uniformity of policy is essential."
24. Washington R. R. Co. v. Varnell, 98 U. S. 479, 25 L. ed. 233 (1878).
25. The National Air Transport Co. advertises that during 1929 its planes,
exclusive of experimental equipment, flew a total of 214,354 miles for each
mechanical forced landing, a distance equal to 82 times around the world.
This includes mechanical forced landings of every character, including motor
failures, of which there was only one for each 785,968 miles flown. See
N. A. T. Bulletin No. 37, March, 1930. This information was furnished the
writer by Mr. Thomas Wolfe. Other operators, doubtless, will be able to
offer similar figures.
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plained accidents would be to relieve the passenger from the well-
established rule of assumption of risk and to place a very heavy
burden on a new industry. But what are these risks? In case of
rail carriers, it is held that the risks incident to the mode of travel
in the legal sense are "only such as the utmost care, skill, and caution
of the carrier in the preparation and management of the vehicle of
conveyance is unable to avert.126  Since the assumption of risk on
the part of the passenger is greater when traveling by air, unques-
tionably the courts will hold the carriers to the utmost care in pro-
viding for his safety. Where the injury occurs through the failure
of the carrier to adopt safety devices of proved value, which might
have averted the accident, the carrier will probably be held liable.
The companies will no doubt be held to the strictest compliance with
all rules and regulations of both state and federal governments, such
as licensing requirements, condition of planes, etc. However, it is
believed that the mere fact of an accident, without testimony or other
evidence of violation of rules and regulations or failure to provide
proper equipment and safety devices, should not raise a presumption
of negligence against the carrier sufficent to form a basis of recovery.
From the foregoing, it would appear that the provision in the
proposed uniform ticket contract to the effect that the passenger
"voluntarily assumes the ordinary risks of air transportation" is
quite broad and will be qualfied somewhat by the courts. Instead,
the passenger will be held to assume only such risks as the carrier
cannot avert by the utmost skill, care, and caution in the preparation
and management of the plane, consistent with the practical opera-
tion of the business and strict compliance with governmental rules
and regulations pertaining to air passenger transportation.
The provisions relative to the landing and discharge of passen-
gers will be upheld only if the conduct of the pilot is adudged rea-
sonable.
26. Washington R. Co. v. Varnell, supra.
